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Keith Windschuttle unleashed a storm of controversy with the publication of The 
Fabrication of Aboriginal History: Volume One, Van Diemen’s Land, 1803-1847 (2002; 
reprinted with corrections 2003). In a series of events unusual for works of this kind, 
Windschuttle’s book received considerable media exposure: almost immediately it 
became the focal point of impassioned debate. The debate moreover continues and 
promises to be with us for some time. The Fabrication is in fact the first of a projected 
series of volumes in which the author proposes to reexamine the early history of 
relations between White settlers and the indigenous populations of Australia 
(Windschuttle, 2003c: 3-4). 
 
The title Windschuttle chose for the book says a great deal about its contents. While 
purporting to rewrite a chapter of early Australian history, Windschuttle is in fact more 
concerned with examining recent Australian historiography. The Fabrication derives its 
power from being an act of accusation. Windschuttle’s real intent is to expose what he 
sees as gross malpractice within the Australian historical profession. His chief 
accusation is that a number of leading academic historians—including Lyndall Ryan and 
Henry Reynolds—have falsified the picture of race relations in early Australia. They 
have, according to Windschuttle, unduly over-emphasized conflict and violence as their 
main themes in discussing relations between Whites and Blacks. Windschuttle criticizes 
Ryan for using the term genocide to describe settler behavior towards the indigenous 
Tasmanians (Windschuttle, 2003c: 4, 13; Ryan, 1996: 255). He chastises Reynolds for 
depicting the Tasmanian Aborigines as engaged in a guerrilla war to defend their lands 
against the White invaders. He deplores the way both historians stress that British 
settlement of Tasmania proceeded through a process of physical elimination of the 
native populations. 
 
Windschuttle does not deny that frontier violence took place. Nor can he evade the fact 
that the end result of White settlement in Tasmania was the demise of the native 
population. What he argues is that the conflictive nature of the relations between Blacks 
and Whites—particularly instances of physical violence and killing—have been grossly 
exaggerated in the service of a political agenda having to do with restoring Aboriginal 
land rights (Windschuttle, 2003c: 28). His thesis is that historians like Reynolds and 
Ryan have “fabricated” a version of early White settlement in Tasmania to suit their 
political stance. They have developed and promoted what Windschuttle describes as an 
“orthodox” view of the Australian past, a view now uncritically shared by other historians 
and journalists of similar political persuasion. 
 
It is this orthodoxy that Windschuttle is setting out to expose as a lie. He contends that it 
has no basis in fact, but has been concocted in order to foster a culture of guilt among 
present-day Australians. But Windschuttle’s book is more than mere accusation; it also 
contains a fair amount of demonstration. In order to make his charge of fabrication stick, 
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Windschuttle engages in what might be called a return to the sources. His method 
centers on a critical reading of Ryan, Reynolds, and others in order to ascertain whether 
the primary sources they cite in support of their claims actually justify the interpretations 
they offer. Windschuttle not only subjects the various works of these historians to close 
scrutiny, he also goes back to the archives and libraries to check the originals. 
 
The point of the exercise is to determine whether the information contained in the source 
materials cited support the inferences the historians have drawn from them. It may 
sound like a tedious procedure, but the findings Windschuttle announces are 
sensational: he believes he has uncovered enough evidence to warrant a charge of 
malpractice against the historians examined. Large sections of The Fabrication might 
fairly be described as a laborious demonstration of this point. Of course Windschuttle 
also has a wider agenda: the exposure of malpractice within the historical community is 
meant to be the first step towards a recovery of Australia’s “true” past. Windschuttle duly 
presents what he calls a “counter-history” of early race relations in Tasmania, one in 
which Aborigines die mainly of disease and other causes rather than at the hands of 
settler violence. But as the title of the book itself clearly indicates, what The Fabrication 
primarily sets out to do is to undermine the credibility of another story, the story of the 
physical extermination of Blacks by Whites that historians have been researching over 
the past thirty years. 
 
Windschuttle, it should be noted, would not accept that he is trying to undermine 
anything. He has consistently portrayed himself as a former true believer in the Reynolds 
view. His road to Damascus was a book by Rod Moran. Tipped off that something might 
be amiss, Windschuttle set out, as he says, on a search for the truth (Windschuttle, 
2003a). His initial misgivings confirmed, he published a preview of his findings in 2000. 
From that point on, he has been tireless in his pursuit. Indeed the very relentlessness of 
his campaign has led some to believe that his disinterested stance might be nothing 
more than a pose. Reactions to Windschuttle’s offensive have varied, but there is no 
shortage of those who counter-expose the exposer by suggesting that Windschuttle too 
has a political axe to grind (Manne, 2003: 1-13; Krygier and van Krieken, 2003: 83; 
Ryan, 2003b: 35 and 2003c: 232). Proponents of this view can point to Windschuttle’s 
access to the media, his connections with the conservative journal Quadrant, or to his 
being awarded a medal by the Prime Minister in 2003 “for…services to history” (Moses, 
2003: 368). On the other hand, to accuse Windschuttle of pursuing political ends merely 
reverses his own charge against Reynolds, Ryan, and others. It intensifies the polemics 
of the “history wars” and deflects attention from a key issue: whether Windschuttle’s 
critique of the historians is based on a sound understanding of scholarly practice. 
 
Surprisingly little attention has been paid to this question. Windschuttle’s attack has 
been greeted with moral outrage in some quarters (Reynolds, 2003). Others have 
expressed their indignation at the spectacle of eminent members of the profession being 
subjected to judgment by an outsider. Many have noted that Windschuttle’s book is self-
published, that the author himself is not an academic in the true sense of the term, 
certainly not a highly qualified historian on a par with his adversaries. Meanwhile the real 
issue at stake—whether or not Windschuttle’s log of claims against the historians has 
any substance—has too often been bypassed. The historians under attack have been 
left alone to mount personal cases for their integrity, so much so that at least one of 
them has complained of being abandoned to the wolves (Ryan, 2003a: 108). 
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The purpose of the present paper is to consider some of the historiographical issues 
raised by Windschuttle’s critique of the Australian historians who are his principal 
targets. Windschuttle himself describes his book as “an excursion into the methodology 
of history” (2003c: 10). In his own words, The Fabrication is an enquiry into “how we can 
know the past, the kinds of evidence we can regard as reliable, and how to detect false 
claims when they are made” (ibid.). These are important if unfashionable questions. 
They suggest there are two key areas that need to be addressed in assessing the 
validity of Windschuttle’s critique. First one must determine what scholarly standards 
Windschuttle is applying in his evaluation of the historical works he subjects to critical 
scrutiny. Second one must ask whether the standards he applies are up-to-date, 
appropriate, and widely shared by the international community of practicing professional 
historians.  
 
These two areas are closely related and need to be investigated together. Moreover the 
second question may be harder to resolve than may at first appear. Historiographical 
practices tend to vary across the profession. They also tend to be controversial and 
remain to a large extent uncodified. Nevertheless it is a presupposition of what follows 
that there exists among professional historians a tacit consensus regarding the 
conventions that govern processes such as peer review, thesis examination, and other 
forms of evaluation. Issues covered by such conventions include the use and abuse of 
primary source materials, legitimate vs. illegitimate readings of evidence, and the rules 
of engagement that inform critical scholarship. As an outsider, Windschuttle has every 
right to question the validity of historical scholarship. But by the same token he may well 
be out of step with prevailing historiographical practice. In this case there could be a 
serious discrepancy in his applying standards that are at variance with accepted 
professional norms. 
 
Let me give an example of what I mean. It concerns a crucial chapter in The Fabrication, 
chapter five, “Historical Scholarship and the Invention of Massacre Stories, 1815-1830”. 
In this chapter Windschuttle’s intention is to offer “a close assessment of the quality of 
evidence deployed by members of the orthodox school of Aboriginal history in Van 
Diemen’s Land” (2003c: 131). Indeed on the same page Windschuttle describes the 
chapter in question as “largely a critique of the methodology of two of the writers this 
school endorses as its most scholarly and distinguished contributors”, i.e., Lyndall Ryan 
and Lloyd Robson. Thirty-five pages later, at the end of the investigation, Windschuttle 
feels that the exercise has revealed that “standards of proof, accuracy and rigour are 
largely absent from the work of the current practitioners of Aboriginal history” (2003c: 
166). But what standards has Windschuttle applied, and do these standards match with 
what Ryan, Robson and other practitioners would regard as normative? 
 
Windschuttle is crystal clear about the standards he expects to be met. He focuses his 
attention on the issue of documentation, and in particular on the citation of sources in 
footnotes. He correctly observes that “the footnote’s role is to permit a reader to check 
the author’s sources, references, facts, quotations and generalisations” (2003c: 132). 
Footnotes, in other words, provide the documentation on which a given historian’s 
conclusions—presented in the text—are based. The question arises, however, as to the 
extent of the documentation required to support a particular conclusion. On this point 
Windschuttle is categorical: “To act in a properly scholarly fashion, authors should be 
able to support, through their footnotes, every factual claim they make” (2003c: 132-
133). 
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To the lay ear this may sound quite reasonable. The professional historian knows such a 
program would be impracticable if for no other reason than that its implementation would 
make history impossible to produce. Desirable as it might be to do so, historians are 
simply not in a position to reproduce exhaustive lists of their sources accompanied by 
lengthy disquisitions on how they reached certain conclusions. The best they can do is 
to present a selection of their material, often scripted in shorthand. What this means is 
that there is rarely going to be a precise and perfect fit between the hard evidence in the 
notes and the inferences historians necessarily draw from it. All historians walk on the 
knife-edge between their evidence and the interpretations they weave out of it. 
Historians are interpreters of documents, not transparent mirrors; they expect other 
historians to challenge their conclusions and they expect that challenge to involve to 
some degree their selection and use of documentation (Evans, 1999: 94). If all this 
sounds controversial, it is not. Such views are well and truly in the mainstream of the 
profession, both here and overseas. It is Windschuttle who has—inadvertently 
perhaps—set up a standard of scholarly performance that is both inappropriate and 
unrealistic. 
 
It is in fact possible to test my assertion simply by checking the main authority 
Windschuttle cites in support of his own view. He quotes approvingly from Anthony 
Grafton (1997: 15) to the effect that in historical scholarship “the text persuades, the 
notes prove” (2003c: 132). But either Windschuttle has not read Grafton with care, or he 
deliberately attempts to convey the false impression that the eminent Princeton historian 
shares his views. To see how far Grafton actually is from offering support to 
Windschuttle on this point it is enough to read his full text. The formulation “the text 
persuades, the notes prove” is in fact Grafton’s own summation of the principles of 
historical scholarship as they were embodied over one hundred years ago in a classic 
manual by Langlois and Seignobos. Grafton quickly moves on from here to distance 
himself from the traditionalist assumption “that authors can, as manuals for dissertation 
writers say they should, exhaustively cite the evidence for every assertion in their texts” 
(1997: 16). In actual fact, writes Grafton, no one can cite the full range of relevant 
sources. This is why, in practice, footnotes never provide complete and totally irrefutable 
evidence for the assertions made in the text. To try to do so would soon prove 
impossible. It would also be useless, since “no accumulation of footnotes can prove that 
every statement in the text rests on an unassailable mountain of attested facts” (1997: 
22). The selection, reading, and interpretation of historical evidence are marked by an 
inescapable margin of subjectivity, and this carries over inevitably into the apparatus of 
the footnotes. Despite their impressive scientific pedigree and pretense, footnotes are 
arranged for effect. To pretend otherwise is to be out of line with accepted international 
standards of history as practiced today. As Grafton writes, every historian “rearranges 
materials to prove a point, interprets them in an individual way, and omits those that do 
not meet a necessarily personal standard of relevance. The very next person to review 
the same archival materials will probably line them up and sort them out quite differently” 
(1997: 16-17).  
 
If footnotes cannot prove “every statement of fact in a given work”, if they cannot 
“prevent all mistakes or eliminate all disagreements” (Grafton, 1997: 233), then what 
purpose do they serve? Grafton identifies two principal functions: first, footnotes can 
demonstrate that the conclusions reached in the text are based on research; second, 
footnotes provide a list of the sources actually used. Under normal circumstances, 
footnotes do not reveal exactly how the historian reached the conclusions presented in 
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the text. Yet the notes “often give the reader who is both critical and open-minded 
enough hints to make it possible to work this out—in part” (Grafton, 1997: 22-23). 
 
Windschuttle may wish to argue of course that Grafton’s comments only show how far 
the modern history profession has deviated from it original mission. Such an argument 
has no bearing on the three points I will make here. First, the onus remains on 
Windschuttle to cite some credible, up-to-date authority to support standards of historical 
scholarship which on the face of it appear to be outdated by some one hundred years. 
Second, it is clear that the chief authority Windschuttle does cite goes directly against 
the grain of the case he wants to argue, an instance by the way of the creative footnoting 
he so deplores in others. Third, the standards Windschuttle applies to the historical 
works he examines in this chapter are both arbitrary and unfair, given that they do not 
represent those that have been in vigor in the profession in recent decades. Indeed the 
only other source Windschuttle cites to support his views provides an account of 
footnoting that is substantially in agreement with Grafton’s (Himmelfarb, 1994: 127-128). 
 
The terms of reference set by Windschuttle are therefore seriously flawed. To “expose” 
the incommensurability between the evidence cited by historians like Ryan and 
Reynolds and their conclusions is to reveal the obvious. That one does not find in the 
footnotes of such historians full and incontrovertible proof of their every assertion is no 
revelation; it is to be expected. That their notes do not exhaustively indicate the 
processes whereby they were able to reach certain conclusions is equally evident. What 
one does expect to find in their notes is an accurate list of the sources, which would 
allow a fair and open-minded critic the opportunity to reconstruct those processes, at 
least to some degree. 
 
With regard to its critique of Australian historians, The Fabrication implements general 
parametres of judgment which are inappropriate. Time after time the investigation 
“reveals” that the documentation quoted by the historians does not prove in any absolute 
way the validity of their theses (Windschuttle, 2003c: 49-50, 134-143, 151-158, 270-280; 
also 2003b: 103-105). Whether Windschuttle has approached his task in a spirit of fair 
play and open-mindedness is best left to the reader to decide. Yet it should be noted that 
where they have responded the historians under scrutiny have sometimes offered highly 
plausible, detailed explanations as to how they reached certain conclusions on the basis 
of the available evidence (Ryan, 2003c: 235-240). To suggest this is not to deny that 
Windschuttle’s investigation also turned up a disturbing number of misstatements, 
inconsistencies, and inaccuracies. Several instances of selective quoting or misquoting 
of key documents showed up in the works of Henry Reynolds (Windschuttle, 2003c: 95-
99, 168-169, 182-183; Reynolds, 1995: 66 and 1996: 29). Reynolds has acknowledged 
these and is in the process of revising them out of new editions of his works 
(Windschuttle, 2003d: 14; Reynolds, 2004: xx, 66). Similarly, Lyndall Ryan has explained 
how her notes were “scrambled” in the passage from Ph.D. thesis to book (Ryan, 2003c: 
234). This resulted in a number of her notes failing to substantiate, or even to address 
the issues being discussed in the text (Ryan, 1996: 92, 102, 139). Yet another case of 
inaccuracy concerned Lloyd Robson’s account of a massacre of Aborigines at Oyster 
Bay in 1815 (Windschuttle, 2003c: 144; Robson, 1983: 50). Closer scrutiny of the source 
revealed an overstatement of the evidence which historians have taken into account by 
now referring to Oyster Bay as “a possible east coast massacre” (Boyce, 2003: 53).  
 
In such cases Windschuttle is perhaps vindicated in his campaign to show “what 
happens when moral sensitivity prevails over historical methodology” (Windschuttle, 
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2003c: 144). What happens is that bits and pieces of evidence get misread, errors creep 
in that tend to flow in the direction of the thesis being argued. Historians know this and 
keep a vigilant watch: Henry Reynolds for example has frequently been accused by his 
professional colleagues of being biased and one-sided in his treatment of settler 
violence towards Aborigines (Attwood, 2003: 171-174). But it is a long way from 
acknowledging minor infractions of this sort to sustaining a case for wholesale 
fabrication. Windschuttle demonstrates that the historians under investigation made 
errors, and that these errors tend, as members of the profession have recently written, to 
move in the same direction (Macintyre and Clark, 2004: 169). That is, they tend to 
validate the overall thesis of frontier warfare being waged between settlers and Blacks. 
Regrettable as such lapses may be, they are not an uncommon occurrence. They do 
not, in the present case, invalidate the general theses being argued. Most importantly, 
their number falls far short of the critical mass that would be required to mount a case for 
fabrication. To see what such a case might look like it is enough to consider that 
compiled against David Irving in the recent libel trial during which he failed to clear 
himself of the charge of having falsified history (Evans, 2002). 
 
Windschuttle’s tactic has nevertheless been to exert maximum leverage from the errors 
he has uncovered. The idea seems to be to conflate minor errors into a general case for 
fabrication. Windschuttle’s success with the wider public stands as a warning to 
historians as to what can happen if standards of accuracy are allowed to slip. The 
consequences are potentially dire and include the loss of public confidence in the results 
of historical research. This is particularly regrettable in the light of what has been 
demonstrated so far, i. e., that Windschuttle’s main offensive is based on 
misrepresenting the basic contours of professional historical practice. In fact, 
misrepresentations similar to those noted above guide other sections of The Fabrication 
as well. Windschuttle appears to believe, for example, that the historical record is 
unequivocal in what it tells us about the past (Macintyre, 2003: 70). In order to know 
what really happened, we need only consult the record. Yet few if any practicing 
historians today would accept such a view. The historical record consists of facts, 
documents, and testimony that require interpretation. Interpretation involves selecting 
and sifting the available documentation into patterns of meaning. As Grafton and many 
others reiterate, no two historians, working on the same set of historical records, are 
likely to construe the past in exactly the same way. Each will do so to the best of their 
ability, in accordance with their particular perspective on events. The fact that 
Windschuttle, in returning to the documents, is able in so many instances to establish an 
alternative version of what happened is of no real significance. It does not mean that he 
has, as he claims, uncovered the truth and exposed falsification. It simply demonstrates 
yet again what all historians know: that the same set of documents is subject to multiple 
interpretations. Does this mean that Windschuttle’s versions of events are of equal value 
to those of the historians whose work he is attacking? Not necessarily, and here we 
reach another area of divergence between Windschuttle’s standards and those of the 
profession at large. 
 
Windschuttle appears to believe he can undermine his opponents simply by showing 
that an alternative reading of the evidence is possible. His method is to show that while 
interpretation A is well established in the literature, one might well derive an 
interpretation B from the same set of documents. But the plausibility of B is not sufficient 
to overturn A. One must go further and show that B is preferable to A because it has 
greater probability of being a truer version of what happened. Windschuttle is certainly 
right to insist that historians who first decide what it is they want to argue, then go out 
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and locate evidence to support their case are not historians at all (Windschuttle, 2003c: 
402-403; Krygier and van Krieken, 2003: 104). They are propagandists for a cause. 
Proper historians must as a matter of course consider the full range of possible 
interpretations suggested by the evidence (Haskell, 1998: 151-152). They then choose 
the one they decide has the greater probability of being the right one. But merely to 
show, as Windschuttle so often does, that an alternative is possible when the evidence 
is viewed from a different angle proves nothing. What Windschuttle needs to do, in order 
to substantiate the claim of fabrication, is to show that his alternative reading has greater 
probability, but has been rejected (or neglected) by historians for ideological reasons. 
This he generally fails to do, simply substituting for what he decries as one tendentious 
reading another equally tendentious one of his own. 
 
The procedure can be illustrated by considering Windschuttle’s approach to the events 
that occurred at Risdon Cove on 3 May 1804. Risdon Cove was the original site of 
British settlement in Tasmania. By 1804 the main settlement had moved down the 
Derwent River to Sullivan’s Cove, later renamed Hobart Town. On 3 May 1804 some 80 
Europeans still occupied the site at Risdon Cove (Tardif, 2003: 218). What transpired on 
that day can be briefly summarized as follows. An Aboriginal hunting party consisting of 
several hundred men, women and children came into contact with the settlement. An 
engagement lasting some three hours ensued, during which a number of the Aboriginal 
party were killed. The incident subsequently became known as the Risdon Cove 
massacre, an event that has been seen by some as marking the beginning of conflict 
between the settlers and the indigenous population. 
 
 Windschuttle’s approach to Risdon Cove is to re-examine the primary evidence. His 
technique is to undermine in a systematic way the testimony on which the claims of 
there having been a massacre rest. The principal objective is to revise downwards the 
Aboriginal death toll as established by an official committee of enquiry in 1830. After 
interviewing witnesses and considering the evidence in the case, the Broughton 
committee of 1830 noted that the numbers of Aboriginal dead at Risdon Cove “have 
been estimated as high as 50” (Windschuttle, 2003c: 21). Windschuttle’s comment is 
that the committee “should have been more circumspect in repeating this figure” (ibid.). 
Windschuttle’s own examination of the evidence leads him to draw the conclusion that 
the engagement at Risdon Cove led to three ascertainable Aboriginal deaths, with one 
and possibly more wounded (Windschuttle, 2003c: 26).  
 
There is nothing particularly shocking about this conclusion. Even Lyndall Ryan sets the 
Aboriginal death toll from the incident at “at least three”, while Henry Reynolds admits 
the exact number of Aboriginal dead is likely to remain unknown (Boyce, 2003: 42; 
Ryan, 1996: 75; Reynolds, 2004: 76-77). What is disturbing about Windschuttle’s 
manner of proceeding is his obvious determination to keep the death toll as low as 
possible, so as to exonerate the colonists of any charge of wrongdoing. A good example 
is his interpretation of the White settlers’ use of the carronade to disperse the hundreds 
of natives thought to be threatening the settlement. All reports agree that the carronade 
was fired, the usual assumption being that it fired shot with devastating consequences. 
Historians are also cognizant of the fact, however, that the carronade may have been 
used to fire only a blank, thereby frightening off, but not physically harming the 
Aborigines (Reynolds, 2004: 76-77). Windschuttle sets forth the two alternatives, then 
opts for the blank discharge, not on the basis of any evidence, but simply because it fits 
in with his overall purpose, which is to portray the settlers as essentially well-intentioned 
and benign (Windschuttle, 2003c: 18). In other words, Windschuttle is guilty of 
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committing two sins he is usually in the habit of attributing to his opponents: first, he 
makes an assertion without sufficient proof; second, this assertion just happens to 
validate his general thesis (Tardif, 2003: 221-222). 
 
To return to the main point, Risdon Cove illustrates how Windschuttle identifies clear 
alternatives, but without necessarily demonstrating greater probability for the alternative 
he himself favors. Risdon Cove also offers a veritable repertory of the devices 
Windschuttle uses in the service of his campaign to discredit what he labels “massacre 
stories”. One of these is argument ex silentio: if an eyewitness fails to mention 
something, one can assume it never happened. Thus if, in their accounts of the 
engagement at Risdon Cove, witnesses on the day mention only three Aboriginal dead, 
that is where the death toll must stand. Yet the failure of a source to mention X does not 
prove that non-X is the case. Many years ago David Hackett Fischer diagnosed this type 
of reasoning as constituting what he called the fallacy of the negative proof (Fischer, 
1970: 47-48). 
 
Windschuttle also makes use of another fallacy listed by Fischer (9-12), the false 
dichotomy. This consists in setting up two alternatives as if they alone exhausted the full 
range of interpretative possibilities. In the case of Risdon Cove, Windschuttle offers only 
two possibilities: either three Aborigines died as a result of the encounter, or as many as 
50 died, with no option left open for a mediating figure. Yet with at least one and possibly 
more wounded (Windschuttle, 2003c: 26), is it not likely that the death toll at Risdon 
Cove might easily have risen to four, to five, to ten or more? To limit the choice to two 
estimates only smacks of setting up a classic false dichotomy, in order to trap readers 
into having to choose between two equally implausible alternatives.  
 
Windschuttle’s whole approach to Risdon Cove suggests he is engaging in the tactics of 
what Fischer (28-31) calls counter-questioning. This consists in effecting “a mindless 
inversion of an earlier interpretation” in order to argue the exact contrary. Counter-
questioning is typical of revisionism. Its methodological weakness lies in its adoption of 
an adversarial mode of enquiry. The method of claim and counter-claim may well be 
suited to a court of law, where the objective is to reach a verdict of guilty or innocent. It is 
unhelpful in the field of history for reasons not dissimilar to those that plague the false 
dichotomy. Counter-questioning too works on the principle of establishing two stark 
alternatives, neither of which exhausts the vast range of interpretative possibilities that 
lie in between. The dangers of counter-questioning include the risk that the critical 
exercise will degenerate into mere point scoring. The counter-questioner focuses on 
proving the adversary wrong as the best means of strengthening the counter-claim, all 
the while remaining blind to other, possibly more viable interpretative options.  
 
There is of course a way of justifying Windschuttle’s tactics, though it is a way of which 
he himself would certainly not approve. It consists in admitting that, for any particular set 
of historical circumstances, there exist multiple points of view, each endowed with equal 
validity. Thus in the case of Risdon Cove one might construe the Windschuttle offensive 
as presenting the White settler version of events, while others have presented the 
Aboriginal version. Some modern relativists would argue that the whole issue of greater 
probability is non-existent, because in relation to any historical event there are multiple 
truths (Burke, 2001: 6, 289). Thus the Aboriginal community has its truth about Risdon 
Cove, the White community has its truth, and these constitute irreducible entities. Indeed 
once the doctrine of multiple truths is accepted, the basis for rational comparison in the 
light of probability is gone. History becomes propaganda for a particular cause, a form of 
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special pleading. The only option left to those who subscribe to the concept of multiple 
truths is to line up behind the banner of their choice and to do battle with their 
adversaries (Haskell, 1998: 10). 
 
Yet the acceptance of the rather obvious point that all history is partial and “positioned” 
does not mean one has to embrace the idea of multiple truths. First of all, truth in history 
is unattainable; all history is but an approximation of what actually happened. This 
applies to oneself very bit as much as to others. Second, it is not only possible, it is 
necessary to consider the evidence on which any and all historical interpretations must 
inevitably rest. Thirdly, any true process of critical scholarship must include ways and 
means of testing and comparing competing accounts of the same events. To say that all 
historical accounts are of equal value in relation to their perspective is too easy. It 
deprives history of its essential critical function and reduces it to mere rhetoric. It also 
means that the counter-assertions of revisionists like Windschuttle can be fought only on 
ideological, and not on historiographical grounds. 
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